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DLD-220        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-1256 
___________ 
 
JAMEICE NASH,  
                              Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JAMES KENNEY, Mayor City of Philadelphia; SETH WILLIAMS, ADA Philadelphia 
District Attorney’s Office; RICHARD ROSS, Police Chief Philadelphia Police 
Department and Commissioner of Philadelphia Police Department, in their individual and 
official capacities; DHS DIRECTOR, Department of Human Services State of 
Pennsylvania; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; GOVERNOR TOM WOLF, PA 
Governor; JOSHUA D. SHAPIRO, PA State Attorney General; JOHN A. WETZEL, 
SEC. of PA DOC; ILEANA JUSINO, SCI-Houtz, RCDS. OFF. Employee; TARA ANN 
MUCHMORE, SCI-Houtz. RCDS OFF. Employee; COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA, 
PA; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-17-cv-02111) 
District Judge:  Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 27, 2019 
Before:  JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 29, 2019) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
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_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Jameice Nash appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his 
complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4(a). 
 In his operative amended complaint,1 Nash alleged that he is a legal permanent 
resident of the United States who was arrested in June 2013 “for an alleged noncapital 
crime of domestic violence.”  ECF No. 19 at 8.  He claimed that he was then detained, 
without bail, until he was ultimately convicted in July 2017.2  He named numerous 
defendants, including, among others, the United States, Governor Tom Wolf, Attorney 
General Josh Shapiro, the City of Philadelphia, Mayor Jim Kenney, and Philadelphia 
Police Commissioner Richard Ross.  He raised claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging 
that the defendants falsely arrested and imprisoned him, improperly denied him bail, and 
deprived him of his right to a speedy trial.  He sought damages of $200 million against 
each defendant.  The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 
                                              
constitute binding precedent. 
1 The District Court dismissed Nash’s first complaint without prejudice to the filing of an 
amended complaint. 
2 According to the Court of Common Pleas docket sheet, he was convicted of attempted 
murder, aggravated assault, and other charges, and sentenced to 10-to-20 years’ 
imprisonment.  See Phila. Cty. Ct. of C.P. No. CP-51-CR-0011415-2013; see generally 
Orabi v. Att’y Gen., 738 F.3d 535, 537 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We may take judicial notice of 
the contents of another Court’s docket.”). 
 3 
 
and the District Court granted the motion and dismissed the amended complaint without 
prejudice.  Nash opted to stand on his amended complaint and filed a timely notice of 
appeal.3 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 
F.2d 950, 951–52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  We exercise a plenary standard of review.  
See Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012).  In reviewing a 
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “we accept all factual allegations as true [and] construe 
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”  Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 
292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  We may affirm on any ground supported 
by the record.  See Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 469 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 We agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case.  To the extent that 
Nash raised claims of false arrest or false imprisonment, the claims are time-barred.  The 
statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Pennsylvania is two years, see Kach v. Hose, 
589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009), and these claims accrued in 2013 when Nash was 
arraigned, see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389–90, 397 (2007).  Nash did not file his 
complaint until 2017, after the limitations period expired.   
                                              
3 Nash also filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied.  Because 
Nash did not file a new or amended notice of appeal encompassing the order denying his 
motion for reconsideration, we lack jurisdiction to consider that order.  See Fed. R. App. 
P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249, 253–54 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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 Meanwhile, Nash’s malicious-prosecution and speedy-trial claims—which 
challenge his post-arraignment detainment—are barred by the favorable-termination rule 
of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).  In Heck, the Supreme Court held that “a 
prisoner cannot use § 1983 to obtain damages where success would necessarily imply the 
unlawfulness of a (not previously invalidated) conviction or sentence.”  Wilkinson v. 
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005).  Nash’s malicious-prosecution and speedy-trial claims 
fall within this rule.  See McDonough v. Smith, No. 18-485, 2019 WL 2527474, at *4 
(U.S. June 20, 2019) (discussing malicious prosecution); Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. 
Ct. 1609, 1615 (2016).  Because Nash has not shown that his conviction has been set 
aside, he cannot bring these claims at this time.  See Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 379 
(3d Cir. 2016). 
 Finally, Nash has failed to state a claim with regards to being denied bail.  
Pennsylvania law provides that “[a]ll prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, 
unless . . . no condition or combination of conditions other than imprisonment will 
reasonably assure the safety of any person and the community when the proof is evident 
or presumption great.”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5701.  To the extent that the prosecutors 
argued that bail was not appropriate in Nash’s case, they are protected by prosecutorial 
immunity.  See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); Root v. Liston, 444 F.3d 
127, 131 (2d Cir. 2006) (“absolute prosecutorial immunity protects a prosecutor for 
advocacy in connection with a bail application”).  To the extent that he asserted this claim 
against the City of Philadelphia, he failed altogether to show that the alleged deprivation 
of his constitutional rights resulted from any official policy or custom.  See Monell v. 
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Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 
47 F.3d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding “vague assertions” were insufficient to impose 
Monell liability).4       
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
 
                                              
4 Nash also objected to an immigration detainer that has been lodged against him, but he 
failed to plead a plausible claim that the detainer somehow violated his rights.  See 
generally City of Phila. v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2019) (discussing use 
of immigration detainers). 
